The deconstruction of an editorial critical of quantum brain theory and an associated article segues via the editorial's marginalia to the Bohmian holomovement and dissipative quantum brain dynamics. The explicate order of Bohm, and Vitiello's ground state between-two that is consciousness (reinterpreted here as existence), are claimed to be the same. This deconstructive response to severe criticism highlights the revolutionary paradigm shift that neuroquantology brings. The method of "deconstruction"-a prime practitioner was Derrida (1982)-offers techniques to undermine the dominant paradigm in a field of discourse.
1 Within the sheltering confines of the journal NeuroQuantology quantum brain theorists have continued to develop a new paradigm of brain functioning and its applications. However, despite over forty years of work since the first systematic proposals in neuroquantology by Fröhlich and the Umezawa group, quantum brain ideas have not caught on in brain science and indeed remain strongly opposed. The struggle against classical brain theory is hardly noticed by the latter, and when noted is highly negative. A recent three paragraph editorial (Segalowitz, 2009 ) in a brain and cognitive science journal, Brain and Cognition, is illustrative of the conventional attitude-and ripe for deconstruction.
The method of "deconstruction"-a prime practitioner was Derrida (1982) offers techniques to undermine the dominant paradigm in a field of discourse.
Since any paradigm can only critique itself within its own paradigmatic framework, it is inevitably anti-revolutionary. Deconstruction is a way around the blockage. In Derrida's hands deconstruction becomes a kind of textual martial arts, using the energy of the text against itself. Deconstruction bootstraps the conventional framework by looking to "marginalia," seemingly insignificant textual markers which turn out to be points of tension in normative texts, something out of the ordinary which signals something is going on that the dominant paradigm defends itself against seeing. (Derrida was much impressed by Freud!) Marginalia single out defenses that serve as well-located incisions for deconstruction.
The present discussion undertakes deconstruction of an editorial strongly critical of quantum brain theory (Segalowitz, 2009) , entitled "A quantum physics account of consciousnesss: Much less than meets the eye." Searching back through 2007 there were only five editorials in Brain and Cognition, all of which were very neutral in tone and quite unlike the editorial considered here, whose unusual intensity and derisive tone is a marginal that attracts the deconstructive eye. Why the heat?
The editorial begins with the observation that finding "a grand theory of everything" (gravity, electromagnetic radiation, atomic forces, etc.) is the goal of physicists and this goal of explaining everything can also be found in psychological realms. Since mental states are brain products, they should be included in the grand theory of everything. This inclusion greases the slide to what the editorial considers a big fat mistake. The "recalcitrant" processes of consciousness are merged with the "equally recalcitrant" processes of quantum physics, the intriguing link (alleged by the editorial) being merely that both are difficult to make sense of, which is after all a mere coincidence. The editorial opines at the end of the first paragraph, "This is hardly a leading beacon of scientific logic or method, but does seem to capture the imagination of some theorists."
The second paragraph of the editorial opens with a striking concession.
Part of the intrigue [the linking of consciousness with quantum physics] can be linked to the language of quantum physics sounding eerily like the language of consciousness … Indeed, the editorial even notes that the linking of consciousness with quantum physics has deep historical roots.
… the originators of quantum physics themselves were very highly taken with William James' explorations of consciousness and purposefully designed their discussions of quantum physics with his insights in mind.
That the discourses of consciousness and quantum physics cross at the very beginning of quantum physics should not be lightly dismissed. Consciousness makes the von Neumann choice to set up a certain measuring apparatus and consciousness makes the Heisenberg choice to pull the trigger on the measurement (Stapp, 2009 ). For Copenhagenism, without consciousness the wave function of possibilities continues merrily on its way. The famous Schrödinger cat is contrived to be in a superposition of being dead and alive until the experimental consciousness comes along and makes an observation. So it is perfectly natural on historical grounds to think quantum physics and consciousness together, contra the insinuation of the editorial.
Furthermore, the link between consciousness and quantum theory is no early historical anomaly but continues to be a center of controversy. Consciousness, after all, comes into the "measurement problem" which remains unresolved to this day despite enormous discussion. Stapp presses this point in an online critique of the influential criticism of quantum brain theory by Koch and Hepp (2006) .
[t]he standard quantum theory of measurements, which was formalized by von Neumann in 1932, and which remains still today the basis of almost all fundamental theoretical work in this field, is generally believed to lead to an almost complete elimination of macroscopic superpositions in the brain, without, however, the diminution of the pertinent consciousness-related quantum effects. The point here is that the quantum state of any macroscopic subsystem of the brain is represented, insofar as its effects on future predictions are concerned, by a reduced density matrix that is expected to be reduced to near diagonal form in the coordinate basis by interactions with the environment. This expected reduction will nearly eliminate all superpositions between macroscopically separated parts of the subsystem. But this elimination of superpositions does not eliminate the need for what von Neumann calls process 1. This process is a choice or action that divides the observed state into disjoint parts, each corresponding to a different experience. Consciousness is brought explicitly into the dynamics at this point: a conscious experience occurs and the state of the observed system is reduced to the part of itself that corresponds to that experience. 2 Though the editorial under consideration insists that any linkage between consciousness and the quantum domain is "a misreading of history," Stapp shows that consciousness remains alive in quantum theory, albeit not securely located.
The final paragraph of the editorial defers to an article immediately following it by Smith (2009), which does not find quantum brain theory at all credible. A "historical lesson" is taught by Smith according to the editorial.
Perhaps simply that before one tries to explain one set of inadequately defined processes in terms of another set of equally undefined processes, it is important to understand the very different problems that the originators of each discipline were facing.
Of course the originators of quantum theory were not trying to solve the problem of consciousness but von Neumann (and Bohr before him, perhaps more discriminatingly) seated consciousness at the head of the table. The editorial argument is accordingly way off the mark since consciousness is inextricably involved with quantum physics rather than trivially connected. Such confident mistakes serve as deconstructive attractors.
Since the editorial points directly to the Smith paper, the deconstructive attention properly next turns to it. Smith offers a sober review of three quantum brain hypotheses:
Eccles-Beck, Stapp, and Hameroff-Penrose, and dismisses all three. He explicitly mentions, but curiously excludes from his discussion, the formulation known as "quantum brain dynamics," which is a highly elaborated proposal (Globus, 2009; Jibu, Yasue and Pribram 1991; Jibu and Yasue, 1995; Vitiello, 2001; 2003; 2004) that has fundamental differences from the three theories he does discuss. Such pointing-to but avoiding-of singles out quantum brain dynamics for the deconstructive intuition.
Smith's ultimate tone, although initially respectful, in the next to last paragraph turns derisive toward quantum brain theory. Smith dismisses it as inconsistent with brain science.
Thomas Henry Huxley … mentioned long ago that there was no more tragic sight in science than a beautiful hypothesis wrecked by an ugly fact. (p. 62) His final summary paragraph segues to David Bohm, who Smith calls a "neuroquantologist," though Bohm was never a quantum brain theorist. Indeed, Bohm (1980) is a double aspect theorist in the tradition of Spinoza. Since consciousness is already present in the most primitive form of matter, Bohm feels no pressure to explain it in brain terms, so he is mischaracterized as a neuroquantologist. Such a mischaracterization alerts the deconstructivist; it is not a mere mistake but a motivated mistake which thereby becomes a marginal. Smith actually brings in Bohm not because of neuroquantological considerations but because he is attracted to Bohm's holonomy, which turns away from the fragmentation of the prevailing paradigm. The discussion of Bohm which takes up the next to last section and continues in the final summary section is actually an interesting non sequitor.
After critiquing three of the four most prominent quantum brain theories and swerving to Bohm, Smith unexpectedly terminates his article with a bombastic quotation from Nietzsche to the trivial effect that it takes time for things to be understood.
[t]he tremendous event is still on its way, still travelling-it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after they are done, before they can be seen and heard… (Nietzsche, 1882, sect. 125 ).
Thus after lambasting quantum brain theory Smith is suggesting that holonomy will some day take over our understanding. But classical brain theory is not holonomicquantum brain theory with its global operators is holonomic-so Smith ends on an intensely emotional note contravening his own mission to oppose neuroquantology.
To reiterate, the method presently followed is deconstructive. We began looking at a blunt critique of neuroquantology, which pointed to a thoughtful critique of neuroquantology, which both points to Bohmian holonomy and specifically excludes the one quantum brain theory strongly influenced by Bohm: quantum brain dynamics (QBD). (The close connection between QBD and Bohm can be seen explicitly in the Appendix to Pribram's 1991 Brain and Perception, written by Jibu, Yasue and Pribram (1991) .) The present deconstruction, perusing the margins of discussion, has segued to a fresh incision into the consciousness/brain relation: Bohmian quantum brain dynamics. What might such a theory look like?
At the core of Bohmian theory is a movement called the "holomovement" which has two phases: "implication" or "enfolding" and "explication" or "unfolding" (Bohm, 1980; Pylkkänen, 2007; 2010) . The holomovement corresponds to two forms of ordering: the implicate order and the explicate order. The explicate order is the quotidian Cartesian order of an extensive world and the implicate order is a plenum of all possibilities which are mutually interpenetrated such that there is nothing particular. Particularities are continually unfolded from the indifferent holomovement to explicate existence under "the law of overall necessity." Explication is guided by the quantum potential (which Bohm derives immediately from the Schrödinger equation) and in quantum field theory by the superquantum potential. The unfoldment process consists of "moments," each of which have a brief duration (Hiley, 2001) . Time becomes nonlocal within a moment.
The core idea of dissipative quantum brain dynamics (DQBD), as developed by Vitiello, is that the ground or vacuum state has "dual modes" which do not exist apart from their relationship. The vacuum state is necessarily "between two." This is a form of duality distinct from the substance dualism of Descartes, the parallelism of Leibniz, the double aspects of Spinoza, or emergentism (Sperry, 1969) , or any other historical form of dualism. The logical relations between the dual modes are a thermofield logic worked out by Umezawa (1993) , who specified the "tilde-conjugation rules." Now Vitiello (2001; 2003; 2004) identifies the state of the between-two with consciousness, whereas for Bohm the vacuum state between-two is explicate.
In the general context of Bohm's ideas the vacuum state should not be regarded as absolute and self-contained. Rather each vacuum state provides the basis for what we called an explicate order so that a set of inequivalent vacuum states could be thought of as providing an array of explicate orders, all embedded in the overall implicate order in which all movement is assumed to take place (Hiley; 2001, p. 32 3 )
The movement between inequivalent representations, between inequivalent vacuum states, is then regarded as a movement from one explicate order to another. It was the implicate order that enabled this transformation to take place 3 Page numbers of quotes from Hiley are taken from www.bbk.ac.uk/tpru/BasilHiley/14MomentsANPA2001W.pdf as an unfolding of moments. (Hiley, 2001; p.33, 1 italics added) This conception of the vacuum state as explicate order opens up the possibility of a Bohmian DQBD, but the link to consciousness needs elucidation, since it is somewhat counter-intuitive.
Any equation of consciousness and explicate order cuts against the grain of the Cartesian metaphysical understanding. Is not res cogitans distinct from res extensa? Indeed, consciousness needs to be understood not in the hovering metaphysical sense but as "existence" (Existenz) which is "world-thrown" (Heidegger, 1927 (Heidegger, /1962 . The state of consciousness is to be amidst the world, engaged with world, while the production process for this worldthrownness is perfectly transparent. (Heidegger's "thrown" is meant to convey the transparency of the process.) Nothing could be more explicate than existence which is always already in the world. Bohmian DQBD turns out to be existential (Globus, 2009) . Explicate existence is between-two.
It must be admitted that the sequences of the present deconstruction have not been linearly logical but lateralized. That is, the line of thought has been at important junctures associative, which has led from the editorial critique of quantum brain theory to Bohm and QBD (via the latter's positive exclusion). The associations have not been mechanical links but coherences, which is after all the modus operandi of QBD. If such an approach is closer to doing poetry than doing science, then sobeit. Revolutionary paradigms will call for unconventional methods.
Summary
The deconstruction of an editorial critical of quantum brain theory has segued via the editorial's marginalia to the Bohmian holomovement and dissipative quantum brain dynamics. The explicate order of Bohm, and Vitiello's ground state betweentwo that is consciousness (reinterpreted here as existence), are claimed to be the same. This deconstructive response to severe criticism highlights the revolutionary paradigm shift that neuroquantology brings.
